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Abstract
In an increasingly interconnectedworld, leakage—broadly understood as unintended displacement
of impacts caused by an environmental policy intervention—has become amajor governance
concern. Yet, leakage remains both loosely conceptualized and poorly understood as a phenomenon
in policymaking. Tofill this gap and broaden the leakage research agenda, we conduct a state-of-the-
art review of scientific assessments on leakage (particularly on land use) and combine it with
conceptual and analytical frameworks from the environmental governance literature.We then
propose a rigorous definition of leakage, discuss frequently overlooked political dimensions, and
develop a typology of leakage pathways. Our analysis of leakage through a governance lens yields five
core insights: (1) Leakage is not simply amechanistic phenomenon, but a complex governance issue
involving questions of institutional fit, interactions, and political agency. (2)Although the land use
literature traditionally focuses on leakage throughmarkets or activity displacement, a governance lens
shows that it also occurs through information,motivation, or institutional channels. (3)As policy-
makersmay act strategically, the unintentionally of leakage should not be assumed but rather become
an object of research. (4)Aphenomenon not initially regarded as leakage can come to be framed as
such through the action of ‘problembrokers’ and changes in policy fields. (5)Policy-makers and
researchers should broaden their focus fromonly avoiding leakage to seeking positive spillovers and
institutional synergies. These insights are illustratedwith examples from two cases relating to land use
policy in Brazil and Southeast Asia.
1. Introduction
Environmental issues are notoriously complex, span-
ning policy domains, economic sectors, jurisdictions
and scales. As such, policies or other interventions
seeking to address those issues often create second-
order effects—or spillovers—thatmay go beyond their
targeted scope (Kissinger et al 2011, Lenschow et al
2016, Liu et al 2018). For instance, energy governance
may have implications for agriculture; changes in one
country’s land-use policy may affect neighboring
countries; and sustainable supply chain initiatives may
create effects that go well beyond their focus areas.
Complexity is inherent in environmental governance
in an ecologically and economically interdependent
world, but that also represents a persistent policy
challenge (Kissinger et al 2011, Liu et al 2018).
Leakage has been a particularly salient issue in that
respect. Broadly understood as the unintended envir-
onmental impacts in one place that result from inter-
ventions elsewhere, leakage has been increasingly
recognized as a major concern for policy effectiveness
in environmental governance (Gan and Mccarl 2007,
Meyfroidt and Lambin 2009). The concept was first
introduced in the climate change mitigation literature
to refer to ‘the impact of the emission policies of the
abating regions on the emission levels of non-abating
regions’ (Bruce et al 1995). It was further developed in
the carbon sequestration context, especially in for-
estry, to describe an unanticipated reduction in net
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carbon benefits as a consequence of the implementa-
tion of carbon sequestration projects (Brown et al
1997). The idea of leakage was then extended to other
topics such as the displacement of land use change as a
result of forest protection policies (e.g. Gan and
Mccarl 2007, Oliveira et al 2007, Meyfroidt and
Lambin 2009, Ostwald and Henders 2014). Leakage,
however, remains a loose concept, sometimes used
interchangeably with other notions such as that of
‘spillovers’ (see Pfaff and Robalino 2017). While
widely described in empirical terms, the phenomenon
is still poorly understood from a governance or policy
process standpoint.
The aim of this letter is to approach and con-
ceptualize leakage as a governance issue. Firstly, it
characterizes what leakage is and the various ways
through which it may happen. Secondly it pays atten-
tion to what can be called the politics of leakage, refer-
ring to the dimensions of human agency behind the
causation, perception, and governance of the
phenomenon. We draw primarily from literature on
land use, where the leakage concept has perhaps been
most elaborated, before connecting to the broader
governance literature to develop insights for environ-
mental policy at large.
This letter is structured as follows. Section 2 con-
ceptualizes leakage and characterizes it as a governance
issue. Based on the land use literature, that section
develops a typology of leakage pathways and unpacks
its often-overlooked political dimensions. Section 3
briefly discusses two cases—forest policy in Southeast
Asia and the Amazon-Cerrado nexus in Brazil—to
illustrate how policy and governance considerations
can usefully broaden the leakage research agenda.
Section 4 concludes the letter with core insights for
understanding and tackling leakage in environmental
governance.
2. Leakage through a policy and
governance lens
2.1.Defining leakage
Leakage can be understood as a subset of the broader
term spillovers. Spillover can be any form of collateral
effect that takes place across (‘over’) established
governance boundaries, be they geographical, tem-
poral, jurisdictional, sectoral, or political (Liu et al
2018, Meyfroidt et al 2018). Spillovers relate closely to
the notion of ‘telecoupled’ systems—as geographically
distant systems that still influence one another (Liu
et al 2015)—as well as to the concept of the Anthro-
pocene and the realization that global ecological and
economic systems are deeply interconnected (Bier-
mann et al 2012,Dryzek 2016).
In contrast to the broad meaning of spillovers,
however, leakage is usually understood in a narrower
sense. It refers to a specific type of spillover inwhich an
environmental policy indirectly triggers impacts that
go against its aims, thus reducing the overall benefit of
the intervention (Meyfroidt et al 2018). This definition
allows for the identification of three key elements that
characterize leakage in the strictest sense:
(1) Impacts occur as a causal effect from an environ-
mental policy intervention.
(2) The variable affected is the one targeted by the
intervention (e.g. deforestation induced by an
anti-deforestation policy qualifies as leakage, as
well as carbon emissions induced by climate
changemitigation policies).
(3) The spillover has a negative effect on the targeted
variable.
The third criterion is occasionally relaxed, leading
some to discuss ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’ leakage.We
however think that this can become confusing and
that the word leakage has an inherently negative con-
notation. Therefore, we will use the term boosting effect
for positive spillovers that fulfill the two first criteria
but not the third (i.e. when the spillover has a positive
effect on the targeted variable).
2.2. Leakage as a governance challenge: institutional
fit and interactions
Questions of why leakage happens, how to prevent it
and how to address it are critical to environmental
governance. Leakage is usually regarded as a result of
deficient policy design, which in turn leads to limited
effectiveness and possibly outright failure. However,
the effectiveness and broader performance of policies
cannot be adequately understood out of context. Such
considerations are highly dependent on the nature of
the environmental issue at stake as well as on the
existing social, political and institutional setting.
The concepts of institutional fit and interactions
(or interplay) may prove helpful in understanding
leakage through a governance lens. Institutional fit
refers to how well the design of a policy or another
institution suits an environmental issue and its context
(Young et al 2008, Vatn and Vedeld 2012). It is usually
divided into an ecological and a social dimension. Eco-
logical fit relates to how an intervention matches the
biophysical characteristics and dynamics of the envir-
onmental issue at stake, such as spatial scale, feedback
loops, etc (Epstein et al 2015). Usual examples of eco-
logical misfit include conservation initiatives that tar-
get individual key species while ignoring interspecies
relations, as well as jurisdictional approaches that
cover only part of a landscape in the face of broader
land use change processes. Leakage is a common out-
come of such misfits, as in the case of national or sub-
national policies aimed at tackling global climate
change.
Social fit, in turn, relates to how well an interven-
tion suits the prevailing values, norms, interests and
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preferences of an environment, and how it targets the
appropriate decision-making actors. Conservation
initiatives are known to be more effective when they
reflect those actor features in the existing social setting
(Meek 2013). As social orders change, institutionsmay
therefore experience situations where ‘fit turns into
misfit and back’ (Haller et al 2013). Conservation
interventions that ‘backfire’ or turn into perverse
incentives due to mismatches with prevailing norms
and behaviors are clear examples of how social misfit
can lead to leakage (Alpízar et al 2017a; see also 2.3).
Leakage also relates to the subject of institutional
interactions. In an increasingly interdependent world,
institutions aiming to prevent or address environ-
mental issues frequently interact with one another and
produce impacts elsewhere (Kissinger et al 2011,
Visseren-Hamakers 2015, Bastos Lima et al 2017).
Interactions may exist even within a single institu-
tional framework, as in the case of the Sustainable
Development Goals (Ehrensperger et al 2019). Such
interactions may be conflictive when they compro-
mise each other’s effectiveness, innocuous when there
are no perceived effects, or synergistic when there is an
added value from the interaction of those policies
(Bastos Lima et al 2017). In the case of land use policy,
therefore, dealing with leakage and boosting effects
requiresmanaging interactions amongst different land
use systems and various institutions in place (includ-
ing policy drivers of land use change and pre-existing
conservation policies).
A governance lens thus suggests that leakage and
other forms of spillover are not simply side-effects to
be avoided at all costs through some perfectly designed
policy-making. Rather, environmental governance is
largely a matter of managing complexity, including
spillovers and institutional interactions (Visseren-
Hamakers 2015, Bastos Lima et al 2017, Lambin and
Thorlakson 2018). Researchers and policy-makers
interested in leakage and boosting effects may there-
fore need to also consider a broader range of issues,
instead of only looking at individual policy design.
These may include issues of institutional coordination
and policy coherence, as well as those concerning how
to minimize mismatches and maximize synergies in a
dynamicway (Sterner et al 2019).
2.3. Leakage pathways
When approaching the issue of leakage from a govern-
ance standpoint, understanding how it can happen is
key. Causal relationships between sustainability inter-
ventions and spillover effects have long been studied
through modeling and statistical techniques (see
Golub et al 2013, Jadin et al 2016), and recent syntheses
have described some of their main pathways or
mechanisms (see Pfaff and Robalino 2017, Meyfroidt
et al 2018). However, while most studies focus on
economic or material means, a broader governance
scope reveals that leakage and boosting effects can also
occur through other pathways, such as diffusion of
information or motivations. Based on a state-of-the-
art review of the land use literature, this section takes a
comprehensive outlook on leakage to summarize the
various mechanisms identified. It then presents these
mechanisms as a typology of pathways (see table 1).
2.3.1. Activity displacement
Most described cases of leakage operate through
economic mechanisms, either by direct leakage—
changing the behavior of the actors targeted by the
policy intervention—or by indirect leakage—changing
the incentives facing actors not targeted by the
intervention1. The former is commonly referred to as
activity leakage (Meyfroidt et al 2018) and occurs when
agents shift the activities targeted by an environmental
intervention from one place to another. Activity
leakage may occur at different scales. At the farm level,
payments to set aside land may for example lead to
reallocation of agricultural inputs to land not covered
by the set-aside policy (Alix-Garcia et al 2012,
Uchida 2014). In agricultural supply chains, large
multinational companies may reallocate capital or
physical assets from one jurisdiction to another in
response to changes in land-use policies (le Polain De
Waroux et al 2016). Restrictions on land-use activities
(e.g. through the establishment of protected areas)
may also induce migration, resulting in the shift of
environmental pressures (although these effects are
ambiguous and context-dependent, sometimes lead-
ing to reduced pressure elsewhere (Pfaff and
Robalino 2017)).
Activity leakage is an example of what the litera-
ture on trade and environment refers to as ‘industrial
flight’, or the push effect of environmental policy
interventions. It is a typical example of institutional
misfit, where leakage occurs because of insufficient
(spatial) coverage of the policy intervention. The like-
lihood of activity leakage is higher where: production
factors or inputs are highly mobile (such that labor
and capital affected by land-use policies are easily real-
located to places with available and accessible land),
there is a lack of off-farm alternatives or cultural pre-
ferences for land-based activities, or the Sunk costs of
capital or labor investments in the initial place are not
too large (Wunder 2008).
2.3.2.Market-mediated effects
Indirect leakage through economic channels is often
termed market-mediated leakage (Pfaff and Roba-
lino 2017). Market-mediated leakage can result from
changes in either input prices or output prices, some-
times referred to as ‘land-market leakage’ or ‘com-
modity-market leakage’ (Meyfroidt et al 2018). An
example of the former is when land prices go up, for
instance due to biofuel policies increasing land
1
Direct and indirect leakage correspond, alternatively, to what
Aukland et al (2003) call primary and secondary leakage.
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demand or conservation policies restricting land
supply, thereby capitalizing farmers and facilitating
expansion in forest frontier areas (Richards 2015,
Egeskog et al 2016, Richards and Arima 2018). An
example of the latter is the indirect land-use change
effects of biofuel policies; increased demand for
agricultural land for biofuel production in one region
leads to changes in global crop prices, resulting in
agricultural expansion (and associated carbon emis-
sions) in other parts of the world, mediated through
global agriculturalmarkets (Hertel et al 2010).
Risks ofmarket-mediated leakage depend not only
on themagnitude of the price changes (in input prices,
such as labor or fertilizers, or output prices for agri-
cultural or forestry commodities), but also on the
extent to which prices transfer across space and those
changes are absorbed through reduction in demand
and/or intensification in production (Hertel 2018).
2.3.3. Information
Informational spillovers are typically positive (i.e.
boosting effects), occurring through learning processes
that result in reduced uncertainty around the costs or
benefits of conservation practices. For instance, agents
targeted by a conservation intervention may apply the
policy-compliant practice on non-treated land, con-
tinue the practice even after the intervention has ended,
or spread it amonguntreated agents (Pfaff andRobalino
2017). Examples of the latter are: the study by Lewis et al
(2011) showing how the adoption of organic dairy
farming practices spread between farms due to reduced
uncertainties and costs of information acquisition; and
the study by Robalino and Pfaff (2012) that, by showing
that forest clearing by Costa Rican farmers are affected
by their neighbors’deforestationdecisions, implied that
policies promoting forest clearing or conservation will
spill over to surrounding areas.
Table 1. Summary of the typology of pathways throughwhich leakage or boosting effects take place.
Type Pathway/mechanism Agencya References
Reallocation of inputs: Inputs (e.g. labor, capital, or
agricultural inputs) freed by some conservation
interventionmay be reallocated on the farm, leading to
increased environmental pressure on other land
Direct Alix-Garcia et al (2012),
Uchida (2014)
Activity Migration: Restrictions on agriculture or other extractive
activities could lead to out-migration from regions
facing conservation interventions, potentially raising
environmental pressures elsewhere (but reducing them
locally)
Direct Wittemyer et al (2008), Herrera
Garcia (2015)
Corporate reallocation of resources: In response to
conservation policies in one jurisdiction, agricultural
corporationsmay reallocate resources (e.g. investments,
marketing) to other regions
Direct le PolainDeWaroux et al (2016)
Market-mediated Changes in input prices: land-use restrictions tend to raise
the price of land and to lower the price of other inputs
(e.g. labor, fertilizers), creating incentives for raising
production elsewhere
Indirect Richards (2015), Pfaff andRobalino
(2017), Hertel (2018)
Changes in output prices: land-use restrictions tend to
reduce agricultural or forestry output, raising prices and
creating incentives for raising production elsewhere
Indirect Murray et al (2004), Alix-Garcia
et al (2012), Golub et al (2013).
Information Learning: by reducing uncertainties about the costs and
benefits of conservation, uptakemay increase on land
not targeted or spread to other jurisdictions, typically
resulting in boosting effects
Direct/
indirect
Lewis et al (2011), Robalino and
Pfaff (2012)
Enforcement: increasedmonitoring of those targeted by a
policy interventionmay affect the behavior also of
non-targeted agents
Indirect DeAndrade andChagas (2018)
Motivation Motivation crowding: conservation interventionsmay
crowd out intrinsicmotivations to conserve, leading to
less conservation among agents not covered by the
intervention or by those targeted after the intervention
ends (temporal leakage)
Direct/
indirect
Kits et al (2014), Alpízar et al
(2017a, 2017b)
Institutions Institutional interactions: conservation interventions by one
actor (public, private) in one locationmay result in
policy or norm changes among other actors or in other
regions. These induced policy or norm changesmay be
either supporting or countervailing
Indirect Bastos Lima andGupta (2014),
Lambin andThorlakson (2018)
a Direct leakage refers to mechanisms where leakage is caused by the agents targeted by the policy intervention, whereas indirect leakage is
caused by other agents.
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However, learning may also take place at the insti-
tutional level, leading to the diffusion of policies across
jurisdictions (Stone 2001, Holzinger et al 2008). For
instance, De Andrade and Chagas (2018) show that
transfer of information from Brazilian municipalities
blacklisted by the government for their high deforesta-
tion rates to neighboring municipalities had the effect
of lowering deforestation also in the latter. Another
well-described example of institutional learning is the
‘latecomer effect’, where institutional actors who con-
front a given problem following other actors can learn
from these other actors to exhibit higher clarity of pur-
pose, wield concentrated power, and accomplish their
ends faster (Rudel et al 2019). Note, however, that
information spillovers can also be negative, operating
through social networks and herd behaviors that may
reinforce loopholes in existing governance frame-
works (le Polain deWaroux 2019).
2.3.4.Motivations
Motivational leakage occurs when an intervention
affects the intrinsic motivations of an agent. For
instance, monetary compensation for a conservation
practice—e.g. through Payment for Ecosystem Ser-
vices (PES) programs—can ‘crowd out’ intrinsic
motivations and lead to less conservation after the
intervention ends (a form of temporal leakage).
Kaimowitz (2008) discusses how farmers in Mexico
andNicaragua under PES contracts threatened to clear
forests if payments cease. This is an example of
temporal mismatch between the policy intervention
and the problem it seeks to solve. It may also occur
among non-covered agents, particularly if the policy is
perceived as unfair (Nordén et al 2013, Kits et al 2014,
Pfaff andRobalino 2017, Alpízar et al 2017a, 2017b).
In other cases, however, motivational spillovers
have been found to be positive, as exemplified by a
study of conservation payments in Mexico that ‘crow-
ded in’ intrinsic motivations to conserve land (Alix-
Garcia et al 2018). In general, the crowding in of
intrinsic motivations happens when actors feel that
interventions are supportive, whereas crowding out
occurs when interventions are perceived as controlling
(Frey and Jegen 2001). In line with this, Ezzine-de-Blas
et al (2019) argue that PES programs are more likely to
reinforce intrinsic motivations when they foster (i)
competence (by recognizing skills and supporting per-
sonal development), (ii) autonomy (by an inclusive
design), (iii) social relatedness (by building on recipro-
city, distributive and procedural equity, and inclusive-
ness), and (iv) environmental relatedness (feeling of
belonging, well-being and awareness of environ-
mental quality). In other words, the social fit of a PES
programwill determine whether intrinsic motivations
are crowded out (leakage) or in (boosting).
2.3.5. Institutions
Finally, leakage and boosting effects may also take
place via institutional channels. There is extensive
literature on policy interactions and institutional
interplay that catalog various ways in which policies
may change, support or undermine one another: see,
e.g. Lambin et al (2014) and Lambin and Thorlakson
(2018) for reviews related to land use in the Tropics,
Visseren-Hamakers (2015) and Bastos Lima et al
(2017) for discussions on institutional synergies and
interactions, and Holzinger et al (2008) on policy
harmonization, learning and regulatory competition.
While this literature shows that policy interactions—
within or across jurisdictions—are important for
environmental outcomes, these mechanisms have
rarely been linked to discussions on leakage and
spillovers.
Examples of leakage or boosting effects through
institutional pathways involve conservation interven-
tions that affect norms or policies not aimed at, but
which will indirectly impact the target variable (defor-
estation, carbon emissions, etc) elsewhere. For
instance, the creation of protected areas may affect
public infrastructure investment plans, with potential
conservation implications for non-targeted areas
(Pfaff and Robalino 2017). Similarly, voluntary certifi-
cation standards have occasionally led to changes in
government regulations. There are cases of boosting
effects through the transfer of norms across institu-
tional settings (private to public) (Lambin and
Thorlakson 2018), as well as where private certifica-
tion standards have prompted governments to estab-
lish rival, but weaker, sustainability standards that
might undermine overall benefits. The Indonesian
and Malaysian governmental initiatives to establish
parallel, public palm oil certification systems to sup-
plant the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)
certification may be regarded as examples of that
(Bastos Lima andGupta 2014, Pramudya et al 2018).
2.4. The politics of leakage
In order to fully appraise leakage and other spillovers,
it is crucial avoid interpretations that regard them as
mechanistic in nature, as if they merely were domino
effects. There is a whole dimension of agency, often
overlooked in leakage assessments, that a governance
lens can help uncover. Actors play roles not only as
economic agents (e.g. driving land use change), but
also as political agents in governance (Biermann and
Pattberg 2008). Actors constantly seek to create,
eliminate, or modify institutions to suit their views
(Dimaggio 1988, Weik 2011), and they often group in
advocacy coalitions to pursue the concretization of
policy goals (Sabatier 1988, Weible et al 2011). There-
fore, leakage and other spillovers are not only by-
products of policy design or institutional (mis)fits, but
alsomatters of environmental politics.
Agency is relevant to policy debates on leakage and
other spillovers in at least two ways. First, assessments
have tended to carry the underlying assumption,
implicitly or explicitly, that leakage is always
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unintentional. Although it is reasonable to assume
that certain governance actors may purposefully dis-
place environmental impacts elsewhere, this has been
frequently overlooked in research. Second, as defined,
leakage and boosting effects concern a target variable
used as the reference for assessing policy effectiveness.
However, environmental issues or impacts are not
always fixed or consensually defined. Rather, they
are often subject to different interpretations and
competing framings (Baumgartner and Jones 1991,
Kingdon 1995, Knaggard 2015), implying that what
constitutes leakage can be a question of debate and
contestation.
2.4.1. Unintended bywhom?
Research on leakage and other spillovers generally
assumes these effects to be unintentional (see Van der
Werff and DiMaria 2011, Davies and Oreszczyn 2012,
Lambin et al 2014, Lenschow et al 2016). As such, it
assumes an invariable unawareness from the part of
policy-makers about the full range of impacts from
their interventions. It is as if those behind environ-
mental interventions were always either uninterested
or unable to appraise what may happen beyond their
targeted focus-area. This assumption, however, does
not hold in light of what is known about agency in
governance and strategic policy-making.
Various theories and frameworks attempt to
explain how agents operate in governance. Some
assume actors to be self-interested, profit-maximizing
agents; others are more nuanced in recognizing that
different principles, norms, and belief systems may
guide human action (Sabatier 1988, Weik 2011,
Schlager and Weible 2013). Nevertheless, there is a
consensus that agents tend to engage strategically with
regard to environmental issues. Environmental or
land-use governance, not unlike other fields, is one of
‘highly contested and competing goals, distinctive and
divisive values’ (Willke and Willke 2008). Policies and
their spillover effects, therefore, arise out of compro-
mises between diverging interests and views.
We argue, therefore, that the unintentional char-
acter of leakage should never be assumed; rather, it is
to be an area of research. Certain governance agents
may be well aware of the second-order impacts that a
given environmental intervention could create. Such
effects may actually suit a strategy and even be part of
the very reason why certain agents have advocated for
a given intervention in the first place. In other words,
leakage and other spillovers may be part of an agent’s
policy strategy. Therefore, it is important to distin-
guish between strategy and unawareness, for this
understanding will inform how to eventually tackle
leakage effects. This attribution must always be actor-
or coalition-specific, as some policy-makers may be
playing chess while everyone else is playing checkers.
Information imbalances or a better understanding of
the dynamics across governance boundariesmay allow
some agents to grasp a wider range of impacts from a
possible intervention and account for that in their
planning.
2.4.2. Problem brokering and issue framing
Governance issues usually are strategically framed in
policy discussions, and agendas can change (Slothuus
and de Vreese 2010). For one, what qualifies as a
‘negative’ spillover impact—a criterion to characterize
leakage—is largely subjective. A condition or a situa-
tion may not be perceived as a problem unless it is
framed as one. The legal clearing of native vegetation
in tropical countries, for example, is a contentious
subject of dispute between actors who approve of it,
framing this as ‘development’, and others who see it as
a problem that demands action and policy changes.
Getting people to see a condition as a problem is a
‘major political accomplishment’ (Kingdon 1995).
This is the role played by problem brokers, agents who
purposefully and strategically portray certain situ
ations as public problems for policy-makers to act
upon (Knaggard 2015).
Environmental issues are frequently the object of
multiple concurrent definitions and framings. Issue
framing refers precisely to characterizing situations in
a particular way, often so that it matches or serves
one’s political agenda (Slothuus and de Vreese 2010).
This is clearly seen, for instance, in the constant dis-
putes over what should be characterized as deforesta-
tion. Environmental issuesmay also overlap, aggregate
into larger issues, or be broken down into smaller,
more specific ones (e.g. climate change adaptation
being part of the larger issue of climate change). These
issues can, in turn, constitute several policy fields or
domains, broadly understood as ‘more or less estab-
lished areas of policy that give meaning to common
problems’ (May et al 2006). Rather than being static,
policy fields are thus institutionally constructed and
develop over time, depending on how issues are
framed and how agents converge around them
(Lyngaard 2007,Massey andHuitema 2013).
The dynamic nature of policy fields means that
what actually constitutes the variable being taken into
consideration in leakage assessments can be the object
of debate and may change over time. A case in point is
the debate over what is defined as a forest, andwhether
an industrial plantation (e.g. of oil palm or eucalyptus)
can be classified as forest (see Chadzon et al 2016). An
illustrative example of the implications of this debate
—which we explore in further detail in section 3—
regards negative spillovers from Amazon protection
policies on the Cerrado savannas. Whether this is
regarded as leakage depends on how the variable is
defined, whether ‘native vegetation’, ‘rainforest’, or
some specific environmental concern such as loss of
‘carbon stocks’ or of ‘biodiversity’. The fact that policy
perceptions have changed over time alongside grow-
ing global recognition the Cerrado is a clear achieve-
ment of issue framing and of problem brokers in
bringing it into the scope of consideration.
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Leakage, boosting effects and other spillovers
therefore may be clear analytical categories, but their
application in practice does not escape the grips of
environmental politics. It is important to realize that
even if these concepts are clearly defined, their inter-
pretation may still change along with the under-
standing of the environmental issue at stake. It may
always be the case that different framings or narratives
by different groups compete as alternative representa-
tions of a situation.
2.5. A framework for analysis
A governance lens on leakage opens up questions of
intentionality, issue framing, and agency, i.e. who
decides the scope of a policy intervention and what the
outcome variable(s) of interest is, and on what
grounds? Leakage can be said to occur as a result of
policy gaps (mismatches between the policy scope and
the outcome variables it seeks to address), causing the
displacement of pressures. However, that displace-
ment will only be framed as leakage if it falls within
what is understood to be its area of concern (the policy
field), which is a matter of political debate. By
reframing the relevant outcome variables of a policy,
displacement can be framed either as leakage or not. If
displaced pressures are regarded as positive, that may
be considered a boosting effect when occurring within
the same policy field, or more generally as a positive
spillover if happening outside of it in the broader
policy landscape.
Figure 1 illustrates such discussions on issue fram-
ing, policy fields and agency as a framework to under-
stand and analyze leakage through a governance lens.
It should be noted that ‘policy scope’ does not necessa-
rily refer to a single policy, but rather to the scope of
the policy framework in place, be it a single interven-
tion or a policy mix. Over time, this scope—as well as
the policyfield—can be expanded to address perceived
limitations or narrowed to focus and externalize cer-
tain consequences.
3. A broader leakage research agenda: two
illustrative cases
3.1. Forest policy in Southeast Asia
Although leakage has typically been treated as a policy
design failure, a governance lens allows for a more
detailed understanding of its workings in the policy
process. One relevant illustrative case is that of tropical
forest conservation in Southeast Asia, which has
received major international attention, including
through policies such as REDD+2. The fragmentary
adoption of REDD+actions in Southeast Asian
countries, however, can be considered an institutional
misfit, as there is a spatial mismatch between the
policies’ national coverage and the increasing regional
integration of those economies (Ingalls et al 2018).
This has left room for the displacement of deforesta-
tion from early-adopters and countries with more
rigorous carbon-related regulatory regimes to late-
adopters of REDD+. In this regard, our analytical
framework can shed light and provide insights on a
number of often-overlooked factors concerning leak-
age from REDD+actions and other forest conserva-
tion policies in Southeast Asia.
For one, identifying levers to address such misfits
requires acknowledging that, far from being an unin-
tended and unexpected consequence of poor policy
design, the implementation of forest policies and
resulting deforestation displacement across Southeast
Asian countries is partly an intentional result of gov-
ernments’ strategies. Countries displacing their envir-
onmental impacts (e.g. Vietnam) rely on this as a way
to achieve their domestic goals for environmental con-
servation, regional integration, and economic devel-
opment, through the processing, exporting and
consumption of commodities produced in land defor-
ested in their neighbors. Countries that host deforesta-
tion, mainly through large-scale land acquisitions, in
turn see these activities as core to their national eco-
nomic development by providing an inflow of foreign
capital, job creation and income prospects from nat-
ural resource extraction (Ingalls et al 2018). Such dis-
placement is thus embedded in governance and
political strategies, rather than being an unintentional
outcome ofmyopic conservation policies.
In the case of Vietnam, the Vietnamese govern-
ment began severely restricted wood extraction from
natural forests in the 1990s. At the same time, it
strongly supported the growth of a booming wood-
processing industry, first oriented towards the domes-
tic demand for construction and then increasingly
towards exports (Meyfroidt and Lambin 2009). The
expansion of tree plantations was also promoted, but
even over-optimistic government estimates acknowl-
edged that those policy goals were impossible to
achieve without increasing raw wood imports from
neighboring countries. Such wood imports, often ille-
gal, require interactions between high-level officials
and military officers from Vietnam and from source
countries, as well as among large forestry and furniture
enterprises that are tightly controlled by the govern-
ment (EIA-Telapak 2008, Meyfroidt and Lambin
2009, EIA 2018). All of these developments suggest a
high level of policy planning, rather than unawareness.
This strategy is, in fact, supported by Vietnamese
policies such as the wood import quotas issued by Viet-
namese provinces neighboring Cambodia, which are
incoherent with Cambodia’s log export ban (EIA 2018).
Until 2016, all timber imported legally into Vietnam
was considered to be legal regardless of the situation in
the country of origin (Ingalls et al 2018). Although
unequivocal evidence of intentionality would require
2
REDD+refers to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation in developing countries, a results-based finance
mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC).
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access to first-hand documents or testimonies from pol-
icy-makers, which are not available for Vietnam, this
shows that policy-makers were aware that their policy
goals could only be reached with leakage. The pattern
appears similar in other industries such as rubber, where
state-owned Vietnamese enterprises, supported by other
branches of the government such as embassies, play a
crucial role in facilitating leakage (Ingalls et al2018).
The issue of transboundary displacement of defor-
estation is also subject to competing framings, such as
discourses of national development on the one hand
and of global environmental degradation on the other.
The possibility to frame the situation as ‘leakage’
depends on which one of these two discourses is pro-
minent. For example, the combination of very rapid
economic growth with stringent policies on the pro-
tection of domestic forests has allowed Vietnam to
simultaneously frame itself both as a leader in regional
conservation policies and as a strategic partner for
investments (Ingalls et al 2018). This supported the
efforts of Vietnamese companies and authorities to
play a growing role in forest and land-based activities
in neighboring countries, and to frame these as sup-
porting their neighbors’ national development rather
than as leakage of natural resource extraction.
Finally, as to the mechanisms through which such
spillovers operate, they may be particularly varied in
well-integrated regions such as Southeast Asia. Their
economic integration around land-use sectors such as
agriculture and forestry suggests that activity as well as
market-mediated leakage have taken place (Ingalls
et al 2018). However, boosting effects through institu-
tions—in the form of policy emulation—may also
have contributed to positive spillovers from countries
that have already achieved a shift from net deforesta-
tion to reforestation, countering some of the leakage
effects (Rudel et al 2019). A research agenda on forest
governance and leakage in Southeast Asia, therefore,
needs to be comprehensive and take these various gov-
ernance dimensions into account.
3.2. TheAmazon-Cerrado nexus and deforestation
inBrazil
Land use changes and deforestation for the expansion
of agriculture in Brazil, too, have been a topical
environmental issue and frequent object of leakage
assessments (e.g. Alix-Garcia and Gibbs 2017, Dou et al
2018). Soy and cattle have become major drivers of
conversion both in the Amazon and in the Cerrado,
Brazil’s highly biodiverse savanna. In response, various
Figure 1.A framework for assessing leakage and other spillovers through a policy and governance lens.
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public and private, jurisdictional and supply-chain
initiatives have been put in place to promote more
sustainable land use (Lambin et al 2018). As govern-
mental support for environmental protection in Brazil
deteriorates, the sustenance and success of such inter-
ventions have become even more critical (Pereira and
Viola 2019). However, while leakage discussions have
been crucial in appraising policy effectiveness, they
might also need to be broadened for a more compre-
hensiveunderstandingof that governance context.
The Amazon Soy Moratorium signed by agribusi-
ness in partnership with environmental NGOs in Bra-
zil is a case in point. The agreement, signed in 2006 by
major agroindustries pledging not to source soy from
areas deforested in the Amazon after a cutoff date, was
lauded as a success formany years, as the conversion of
rainforest into soy cropland indeed decreased (Gibbs
et al 2015). However, as soy rapidly expands over the
Cerrado, there is a growing perception that those land-
use impacts have leaked from the former biome to the
latter (Dou et al 2018).
Given such impact displacement, and irrespective
of other drivers that may also be at play, governance
efforts such as those towards zero-deforestation com-
mitments (see Garrett et al 2019) may need to address
some important questions. For one, what is the envir-
onmental issue (i.e. the variable) under analysis: loss of
native vegetation or exclusively rainforest loss? Is the
underlying concern biodiversity protection or carbon
sequestration? Although this is not usually stated
explicitly, the framing of the issue has clearly shifted
over the years. Perceptions of the Cerrado’s value as an
ecosystem (for biodiversity conservation, freshwater
availability, livelihoods, etc) have substantially
increased in recent years, leading some actors to frame
that diversion of soy expansion as a case of leakage.
The Soy Moratorium, however, was essentially a
response to Amazonian conversion (as illustrated by
Greenpeace’s 2006 report ‘Eating up the Amazon’ that
helped create momentum that to the creation of the
moratorium). The belated critique that the morator-
ium is flawed for not also covering the Cerrado can,
therefore, be considered the result of changing fram-
ings and the widening of this policy field to include
more than just the Amazon (see Soterroni et al 2019).
The extent the which the eventual displacement of
impacts from the Amazon to the Cerrado was inten-
tional must also be questioned, for this will suggest
very different courses of action to eventually mitigate
those impacts. Susanna Hecht characterizes the Brazi-
lian Cerrado and other South American woodlands as
‘sacrifice zones’ to where agricultural expansion is
deliberately (or at least knowingly) displaced in order
to save the Amazon biodiversity hotspot and other
‘high forests’ (Hecht 2005, Oliveira and Hecht 2016).
If the ‘sparing’ of the Amazon has indeed been con-
sciously agreed on at the expense of the Cerrado, then
actors with an interest in protecting the Cerrado may
need to prepare to counter interests and veiled land
use strategies. In other words, the political and govern-
ance efforts needed to fix ‘flawed’ policy design are
very different depending on whether those side-effects
are accidental or purposeful.
Finally, through which pathways does such leak-
age take place? This may require appraising not only
activity or market-mediated displacements, but also
the interactions between the sustainability interven-
tions put in place (e.g. the SoyMoratorium) and exist-
ing policy ormarket drivers for soy or cattle expansion
across those ecosystems. A comprehensive assessment
for sustainable land use governance may require con-
certed efforts to both understand and, eventually,
manage those interactions towards boosting effects
and synergies.
This broad scope of questions illustrates how
approaching leakage through a governance lens allows
for a more thorough appraisal of such policy issues,
their effectiveness, and the contexts where they are
inserted. Those are important avenues for further
research.
4. Conclusions
Leakage and other spillovers from environmental
policies have become amajor area of research. In order
to provide greater conceptual rigor and a more
comprehensive understanding of those issues from a
governance standpoint, this letter has developed a
working definition of leakage and an analytical frame-
work that includes a typology of pathways and
often-overlooked political dimensions. This exercise
provides five core insights that may shed light on
analyses of leakage and indicate important avenues for
further research. Although they emerge from assess-
ments on land use policy, these considerations may
also apply and could be tested in other domains of
environmental governance, such as energy use or food
consumption.
First, leakage and other spillovers can only be ade-
quately understood within their specific socio-eco-
nomic and institutional contexts. Rather than merely
mechanical processes akin to domino effects, those are
complex and nuanced governance issues that involve
issues of ecological and social fit, institutional interac-
tions, and political agency.
Second, although the literature (particularly that
on land use) has focused primarily on activity displace-
ment and market-mediated mechanisms (e.g. prices,
input reallocation, production displacement), we
highlight that leakage and other spillovers can also
occur through learning, changes in agent motivations,
information dissemination, and policy interactions.
While there is growing literature on such leakage
mechanisms (especially on motivation crowding), we
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urge the land-use science community to further
explore and also analyze institutional and informa-
tional pathways.
Third, the unintended character of leakage and
other spillovers, and the implications thereof, should
not be assumed, but become an object of research.
Policy-makers may well be aware of the collateral or
second-order effects of the environmental interven-
tions they put in place. Therefore, such issues cannot
be automatically attributed to unawareness. Clearly a
different approach is needed when the spillovers are
deliberate and due to strategic policy-making. Simply
informing well-intended but myopic policy-makers
about the supposedly unintended effects of their deci-
sions may not work. Rather, understanding the role of
political agency in leakage can better equip researchers
and policy-makers to analyze and, eventually, deal
with the issue.
Fourth, the understanding of the variable targeted
by an intervention can change over time. Not only do
policy agendas change, but issues also are con-
tinuously framed and reframed in the policy process
(e.g. what constitutes a forest, why it matters, what
deforestationmeans). As such, something that initially
may not have been regarded as leakage can suddenly
come to be so. In this, a key role is played by ‘problem
brokers’, agents that strategically frame given condi-
tions as problems that need to be acted upon.
Fifth, in an ecologically, socially and economically
integrated world, spillovers may be very hard to avoid,
if at all (Sterner et al 2019). Awareness about their dif-
ferent pathways can help analyze, pre-empt and man-
age different forms of leakage. Much more attention
may be needed on adaptivemanagement that allows to
redesign policies when unwanted spillovers are identi-
fied. However, from a policy-making standpoint, the
aim of having flawless design can be relaxed and more
attention be paid to interactions management and to
how to purposefully create boosting effects and var-
ious synergies. If complexity is inherent in environ-
mental issues, then environmental governance may
need towork not only on, but also through spillovers.
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